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RECENT DECISIONS
Workman's Compensation Act-Death By Suicide-When Com-
pensable.-Plaintiff was the widow of John H. Jung, who was
accidentally injured on October 25, 1939, under such circumstances as
to entitle him to the benefits of the Wisconsin Workman's Compensa-
tion Law.1 Such benefits were paid to John H. Jung during his life-
time and until October 7, 1940, when he died, his death resulting from
injuries which he received when he threw himself from a window in
the hospital. The Commission found:
"... that decedent was capable of appreciating the consequences of
his act, but was incapable of resisting the emotional impetus toward
suicide resulting from the mental condition caused by his injury; they
further found that the decedent's suicide was intentionally self-
inflicted and that his act was an intervening cause for death and that
the suicide and death did not proximately result because of his
injury,"
and denied compensation. Upon appeal the decision of the Commission
was affirmed. Jung v. Industrial Commission, 242 Wis. 179, 7 N.W.
2d 416.
As pointed out by the court this case is not distinguishable from
the case of Barber v. Industrial Commission,2 in which it was held that
death by suicide is generally incompensable because Sec. 102.03, Wis-
consin Statutes, bars compensation for intentionally self-inflicted in-
juries. Death by suicide generally constitutes an intentionally self-
inflicted injury,3 and where the mental ailment of the person ending
his life has not progressed to the stage of destroying the capacity to
entertain an intention, the statute plainly excludes compensation for
the injury. Vennen v. Dells Lumber Co.4 and Simmons Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm.,5 are to the effect that if the decedent did not act upon
uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy but with conscious
volition, recovery is precluded because of the exclusion of Sec. 102.03
of the Wisconsin Statutes.
In Corpus Juris the statement on suicide under Workman's Com-
pensation is as follows:
"Provided the insanity results from a compensable accident and
not from brooding over the injury or causes, the suicide of an employee
while insane may entitle his dependents to compensation therefrom;
thus, where there follows as a direct result of the accident an insanity
1 Chap. 102, WISCONSIN STATUTES.
2241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W. 2d 199 (1942).
3 Peterson v. Time Indemnity Co., 152 Wis. 562, 140 N.W. 286 (1913) ; Ladwig
v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 56, 247 N.W. 312 (1933).
4 161 Wis. 370, 154 N.W. 640 (1915), L.R.A. 1916 A, 273, Ann. Case 1918,
B 293.
5211 Wis. 445, 248 N.W. 443 (1933).
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of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an
uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious
volition to produce death, there is a direct and unbroken causal con-
nection between the physical injury and the death; however, where
the suicide is the result of the voluntary and wilful choice determined
by a moderately intelligent mental power with knowledge of the pur-
pose and effect of the act, even though dominated by a disordered mind,
a new and independent agency breaks the causation.""
The second basis for the decision in the Jung case, supra, is that
the act of suicide resulting from a moderately intelligent power of
choice is an intervening cause which precludes compensation. This
follows the rule laid down in Daniels v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Co. in which the court said:
"Where there follows, as the direct result of a physical injury, an
insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life
through an uncontrollable impulse, or in a delirium of frenzy, without
conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge. of the physical
consequences of the act; then there is a direct and unbroken causal
connection between the physical injury and the death. But where the
resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary will-
ful choice, determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which
knows the purpose and the physical effect of the suicidal act, even
though choice is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there
is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of causation
arising from the injury."
Other jurisdictions have followed the same ruling. Among these
are Pennsylvania,8 Massachusetts,9 Vermont, 10 and Texas.
Recovery was allowed in the case of Jones v. Trades and General
Ins. Co." In this case the deceased injured his foot and bloodpoisoning
set in and the deceased took poison which caused his death. The court
said:
"The act of the deceased in drinking the poisonous solution was
done designedly, but that by reason of the disturbed condition of his
mind, resulting from the pain he was suffering from injury and the
infection therefrom, he was incapable of appreciating the consequences
of the act, which therefore was not willful and intentional, within the
legal concept of those terms."
6 CoRPUS JuiRs 71, Sec. 392.
7 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424. (1903).
8 Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Penn. 275, 112 AtI. 458 (1921).
9 Tetroult's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231 (1932).
In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
lOMcKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vermont 45, 134 Atl. 640 (1926).
11 Tex. Civ. Appeals, 144 S.W. 2d 689 (1940)..
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From the foregoing it would seem that the controlling element in
determining whether or not death by suicide is compensable under
the Workman's Compensation Act is the state of mind at the time of
the suicide. If deceased commits the act realizing the consequences of
it, there can be no recovery, but if he acts in a delirium or frenzy,
making him incapable of appreciating the consequences of his act,
recovery will be allowed.
JOHN KoCH.
